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Cleared For Landing: Airbus, Boeing,
and the WTO Dispute over Subsidies
to Large Civil Aircraft
Jeffrey D. Kienstra*
Abstract: Competition between Airbus and Boeing in the large civil aircraft
industry grew contentious as Airbus began to overtake Boeing in its long-held
position as the world‘s leading producer of large civil aircraft. Airbus and
Boeing had also each embarked on multi-billion dollar investments into the
development of new aircraft, further raising the stakes. The United States and
European Communities in turn increasingly scrutinized the subsidies provided
by their counterpart to its respective aircraft manufacturer. This conflict over
subsidies, which had persisted between the United States and European
Communities since the inception of Airbus in 1970, reached a head in 2004
when the United States initiated the dispute resolution process of the World
Trade Organization over subsidies provided by the European Communities to
Airbus. The European Communities responded by filing a parallel complaint
regarding subsidies provided to Boeing by the United States.
After over eight years, the dispute is reaching the conclusion of the WTO dispute
resolution process, but whether or how the process will resolve the dispute is
still very much in question. More important, though, is how the instant dispute
will affect the long-term question of the permissibility of subsidies in the large
civil aircraft market. The history of the dispute suggests that the parties will
negotiate an agreement addressing their short-term interests but setting the
stage for another conflict down the road. Instead, the parties should use the
information and bargaining positions provided through the WTO process to
negotiate a comprehensive agreement eliminating subsidies to the maximum
extent possible. This should protect the parties‘ immediate interests, avoid the
prospect of a trade war, further free trade generally, and provide a framework
applicable to the large civil aircraft industry as a whole, including its emerging
participants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2004, as competition in the already highly competitive
industry of commercial aircraft escalated between Airbus and Boeing, each
with a revolutionary new aircraft under development, the dispute between
the European Communities (EC) and the United States over subsidies given
to the respective organizations came to a head. On October 6, 2004, the
United States unilaterally renounced a trade agreement between the two
parties and initiated the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute
resolution process, alleging that the EC violated international trade
agreements, primarily by giving launch aid to Airbus.1 That same day, the

1

Nils Meier-Kaienburg, The WTO‘s ―Toughest‖ Case: An Examination of the
Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure in the Airbus–Boeing Dispute Over
Aircraft Subsidies, 71 J AIR L. & COM. 191, 201, 205 (2006); Request for Consultations by
the United States, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting
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EC filed a separate complaint in the WTO against the United States,
alleging that Boeing received prohibited government subsidies in the form
of tax breaks and preferential government contracts. 2 At that time, the
dispute was expected to be the biggest and most expensive ever heard under
the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 3
Over eight years later, the dispute resolution process is still not
complete. Each of the complaints has completed the panel4 and appellate5
stages, and both parties have claimed compliance with the findings. 6
Predictably, those claims have been vigorously contested, spawning
additional panel and potentially appellate proceedings to determine whether
the parties have complied with the WTO‘s findings and removed the
adverse effects of their subsidies.7 This enforcement stage could still drag
on for some time, and even then, the conclusion of the WTO process could
be just the first step in resolving the underlying issues. This dispute, which
has festered since Airbus was created in 1970 specifically to compete with
the American aircraft industry, has been a particular challenge so far for the
WTO, and the effect the WTO process will have on efforts to resolve the
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/1 (Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter DS316 Request for
Consultations].
2
Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 207; Request for Consultations by the European
Communities, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS317/1 (Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter DS317 Request for Consultations].
3
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. Peter Mandelson, the EU Trade Commissioner, responded
to the United States‘ initiation of the DSU by saying ―America‘s decision will, I fear, spark
probably the biggest, most difficult and costly legal dispute in the WTO‘s history.‖ David
Gow, Snubbed Mandelson Takes Boeing Fight to WTO, GUARDIAN (May, 31, 2005, 7:05
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2005/jun/01/europeanunion.theairlineindustry.
4
Panel Report, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/R (June 30, 2010) [hereinafter DS316 Panel
Report]; Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS353/R (Mar. 31, 2011) [hereinafter DS353 Panel Report].
5
Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R (May 18, 2011)
[hereinafter DS316 AB Report]; Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶1350(b)–(c), WT/DS353/AB/R
(Mar. 12, 2012) [hereinafter DS353 AB Report].
6
Communication from the European Union, European Communities and Certain
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/17 (Dec. 1,
2011); Communication from the United States, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in
Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/15 (Sept. 23, 2012).
7
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Constitution of the Panel,
Note by the Secretariat, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/24 (Apr. 25, 2012); Recourse to Article
21.5 of the DSU by the European Union, Request for Consultations, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/16 (Sept.
25, 2012).
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dispute is still uncertain.
Part II of this Comment examines the histories of the companies at
issue and how competition within the large civil aircraft (LCA)8 industry
brought about this dispute. Part III introduces the international agreements
relevant to the dispute, including the 1979 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), 9 the bilateral 1992 Agreement on Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft between the United States and the EC,10 and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) 11 and DSU that
accompanied the creation of the WTO in the Uruguay Round in 1994. Part
IV traces the dispute through the WTO dispute settlement process. Part V
analyzes the future of the dispute, including difficulties in reaching a
negotiated agreement, and the potential resolutions. It suggests that while
an agreement addressing only short-term concerns may be the easy and
likely resolution, the parties should utilize the unique position that the WTO
process, and its accompanying expense of significant time and resources,
has afforded them to craft a comprehensive agreement suitable to
addressing the future of the LCA industry.
II. THE COMPANIES
A. Boeing
The Boeing Company (Boeing) was incorporated by William Edward
Boeing on July 15, 1916, as Pacific Aero Products Company in Seattle,
Washington, and became the Boeing Airplane Company a year later. 12
8

LCA are typically defined as aircraft with more than one hundred seats. U.S. INT‘L
TRADE COMM‘N, PUB. 3433, COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT
AEROSTRUCTURES INDUSTRY, INVESTIGATION NO. 332-414, at xix n.1 (2001), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/PUB3433.PDF. LCA currently in production include
the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 in the 100–200 seat range, the Boeing 767 and 787 and
Airbus A330 in the 200–300 seat range, the Boeing 777 and Airbus A340 in the 300–400
seat range, and the Boeing 747 and Airbus A380 at 400-plus seats. BOEING COMMERCIAL
AIRPLANES, BACKGROUNDER 1–3 (June 2011), http://www.boeing.com/commercial/
pdf/BCA_backgrounder.pdf; Passenger Aircraft, AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/
aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
9
Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 12, 1979 [hereinafter Subsidies Code],
available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/tokyo_scm_e.pdf.
10
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
European Economic Community Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on
Trade in Civil Aircraft on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (1992) [hereinafter LCA
Agreement], available at http://trade.gov/static/aero_lgl_usaeeclca.pdf.
11
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, Annex 1A
[hereinafter SCM Agreement].
12
History, The Beginnings: 1903–1926, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/history/
narrative/n003boe.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
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Boeing‘s initial success in the aircraft industry was driven by its production
of military aircraft, but it gained a foothold in the civil aviation industry in
the 1950s with its development of the 707, a single-aisle, four engine
aircraft, and the United States‘ first jet airliner.13 Boeing continued its
growth in the 1960s when it introduced the 737, a short-to-medium-range
single-aisle aircraft, which has sold over 6,000 aircraft and is the best
selling commercial aircraft in history. 14 The backbone of Boeing‘s civil
aircraft line is the 747, which it introduced in 1969, and which was the
largest and most expensive aircraft in the world until the introduction of the
Airbus A380 in 2007.15 Since its introduction, the 747 has been the premier
aircraft for long-haul international flights, and has been the world‘s most
profitable commercial aircraft.16 Boeing has also produced families of
aircraft serving a wide range of capacities and ranges between the 737 and
747, including the mid-size single-aisle 757, twin-aisle 767, and long-range
twin-aisle 777.17
Following its merger with McDonnell Douglas Corporation in 1997,
Boeing became the last remaining major producer of commercial aircraft in
the United States. 18 Currently, Boeing controls nearly one hundred percent
of the U.S. civil aviation manufacturing industry, and is the largest
exporting manufacturer in the world.19 In addition to its civil aircraft
division, Boeing is the second largest defense company in the world,
13
Marc C.S. Mathis, Comment, Uncivil Aviation: How the Ongoing Trade Dispute
Stalemate Between Boeing and Airbus Has Undermined GATT and May Continue to Usher
In an Era of International Agreement Obsolescence Under the World Trade Organization,
13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 177, 181–83 (2005); 707 Family, BOEING,
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/707family/index.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012). First
delivered on August 15, 1958, to Pan American World Airways, the 707 and Pan Am were
the most successful airline-jetliner combinations of their era. Michael Lombardi, Seventh
Heaven, 50 Years Ago, Boeing and Pan Am Revolutionized Travel with the 707, BOEING
FRONTIERS, July 2008, at 8, 8–9, available at http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers
/archive/2008/july/i_history.pdf.
14
About the 737 Family, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737family/
background.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
15
Daniel I. Fischer, Comment, ―Super Jumbo‖ Problem: Boeing, Airbus, and the Battle
for the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 865, 877 (2002); Mathis, supra note
13, at 183.
16
Fischer, supra note 15, at 877.
17
BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES, supra note 8, at 2–3; U.S. INT‘L TRADE COMM‘N,
PUB. 3143, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE GLOBAL LARGE CIVIL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS FOR THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. INDUSTRY,
INVESTIGATION NO. 332-384, at 3-5 to 3-6 (1998) [hereinafter CHANGING STRUCTURE],
available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub3143.pdf; Boeing 7-Series: Fast
Facts: Boeing 757, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/news/feature/sevenseries/757.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2012).
18
Steven Pearlstein, Europeans Relent, Back Boeing Merger, WASH. POST (July 24,
1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/longterm/boeing/boeing.htm.
19
Fischer, supra note 15, at 866.
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providing military aircraft and defense products and programs for the
militaries of the United States and other nations, with the United States
government being its largest customer. 20
After struggling during the downturn in the aviation industry following
September 11, 2001, Boeing affirmed its commitment to developing and
producing commercial aircraft when it announced the beginning of
development of a new commercial aircraft in 2003.21 The 7E7, later named
the 787 Dreamliner (787),22 is a mid-sized aircraft meant to replace the 767.
It is also the first commercial aircraft to be built more than half with
lightweight composite materials, which make up the majority of its tail,
wing, and fuselage. 23 A revolutionary development in aircraft design, the
light weight of the composite materials allows the 787 to consume twenty
percent less fuel than comparably sized aircraft, while also matching the
speed and range of larger aircraft.24
Japan‘s All Nippon Airways placed the initial order of 787s, ordering
fifty on April 26, 2004, and Boeing secured orders and commitments for
237 787s in the first year of sales.25 After several years of delays in design
and production, Boeing delivered the first 787 on September 26, 2011.26
Boeing has received over 800 orders for the 787, a record for a Boeing
aircraft still under development, but its commercial success is not yet
guaranteed.27 Some analysts predict that Boeing will need to sell over
20
First Written Submission by the European Communities, United States—Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 49, WT/DS353 (July 11, 2007) [hereinafter DS353
EC First Written Submission], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/
september/tradoc_136101.pdf.
21
Sally B. Donnelly, Can This Plane Save Boeing?, TIME, Oct. 20, 2003, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1005919-1,00.html.
22
See 787 Dreamliner: About the 787 Family, BOEING, http://boeing.com/commercial/
787family/background.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
23
Martha Walz, The Dream of Composites, R&D MAGAZINE, Nov. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.rdmag.com/Featured-Articles/2006/11/The-Dream-of-Composites/;
George
Marsh, Boeing‘s 787: Trials, Tribulations, and Restoring the Dream, REINFORCED PLASTICS
(Nov. 9, 2009), http://www.reinforcedplastics.com/view/9669/boeings-787-trials-tribulations
-and-restoring-the-dream/.
24
787 Dreamliner: About the 787 Family, supra note 22. This efficiency is crucial to the
design of the aircraft, as low operating costs have become increasingly important in airline‘s
decisions to purchase aircraft. CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 1-3 to 1-4.
25
Lori Gunter, Great Expectations, BOEING FRONTIERS (June 2005),
http://www.boeing.com/news/frontiers/archive/2005/june/cover.html; Marsh, supra note 23.
26
Aubrey Cohen, Boeing Celebrates Delivery of First 787 Dreamliner, SEATTLEPI (Sept.
26, 2011, 10:40 AM), http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/2011/09/26/boeing-celebratesdelivery-of-first-787-dreamliner/; David Kesmodel & Daniel Michaels, For Boeing, It‘s
Been a Long, Strange Trip: After Three-Year Delay, Plane Maker Readies 787 Dreamliner
Production; But Can It Crank Out 10 Per Month?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904563904576585250595434650.html.
27
Kesmodel & Michaels, supra note 26; Kyle Peterson, First Boeing 787 Delivered;
Here Comes the Hard Part, REUTERS (Sept. 26, 2011, 6:06 AM),
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1,000 aircraft before breaking even, and it will need to produce the aircraft
at an unprecedented rate in order to get there and to avoid substantial costs
for delays and cancellations.28
B. Airbus
In response to American dominance in the commercial aircraft
industry, a group of European nations organized in the late 1960s to create a
European organization that could rival the American aircraft industry. 29 In
1970, Airbus Industrie GIE (Airbus GIE) was formed as a consortium
between Aerospatiale of France and a group of Germany‘s leading
manufacturing firms, which became Deutsche Aerospace. 30
British
Aerospace of the United Kingdom and Construcciones Aeronauticas SA of
Spain (CASA) would also later join the consortium.31 In this form, Airbus
GIE was ―a loose association of fully independently cost-centered
companies.‖32 This organizational form underwent a transformation
between 2001 and 2004 when the four independent partners became
wholly-owned subsidiaries of Airbus SAS, which at that time was eighty
percent owned by the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company
(EADS).33 In 2006, EADS bought out the remaining twenty percent from
BAE Systems of the United Kingdom.34
Today, Airbus SAS is
incorporated as a ―simplified joint stock company,‖ and is a division of
EADS.35
Airbus has developed a full line of aircraft across the LCA market,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/26/uk-boeing-analysis-idUSLNE78P01U20110926.
28
Kesmodel & Michaels, supra note 26; see Peterson, supra note 27.
29
CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 3-15; Mathis, supra note 13, at 185, 189.
30
Mathis, supra note 13, at 183–84; Company Evolution: The Success Story of Airbus,
AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/en/corporate/people/company_evolution (click Dec. 1970
tab of the timeline, Creation of Airbus Industrie) (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
31
Ryan E. Lee, Comment, Dogfight: Criticizing the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Amidst the Largest Dispute in World Trade Organization History,
32 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 115, 119 (2006). This left the ownership of Airbus
composed of 37.9% each by Aerospatiale and Deutsche Aerospace, 20% by British
Aerospace, and 4.2% by CASA. The Success Story of Airbus: Technology Leaders (1977–
1979), AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/company/history/the-narrative/technology-leaders1977-1979/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
32
First Written Submission by the European Communities, European Communities
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 69, WT/DS316 (Apr. 5, 2007)
[hereinafter DS316 EC First Written Submission], available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2007/april/tradoc_134551.pdf.
33
Id. at ¶ 68.
34
First Written Submission of the United States, European Communities – Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶43, WT/DS316 (Nov. 15, 2006) [hereinafter DS316
US First Written Submission], available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/816.
35
Mathis, supra note 13, at 190.
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substantially competing with each of Boeing‘s aircraft.36 The A320 family,
consisting of short-to-medium-range single aisle aircraft competing directly
against the Boeing 737, entered service in 1988.37 In 1987, Airbus
launched the development of the A330 and A340, wide-body jets
competing in markets similar to the 767 and 777.38 The signatures of
Airbus‘ aircraft are its fly-by-wire electronic flight control systems,
introduced for the first time in commercial jetliners in the A320, and
significant commonality within and across its aircraft families, reducing
operations, training, and maintenance costs. 39
In overcoming the considerable barriers to entry in the LCA industry40
and developing these aircraft, Airbus has depended on significant
development financing provided by its member nations, 41 termed ―member
state financing‖ by the EC, and ―launch aid‖ by the United States.42
Though the precise nature of those measures has been a significant point of
contention, the financing is generally debt with payment of interest and
principal based on a specified portion of the revenue of each aircraft sold,
sometimes followed by additional royalty payments per aircraft, typically
giving the lender less upside than equity, but less security than debt.43
Airbus has received this financing from its member states for the
development of each of its aircraft, 44 though the nature and amount has been
36
Id. at 189–90; see Lcmortensen, Airbus and Boeing: Passengers vs Range (Nov. 20,
2009), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Airbus_and_Boeing_Passengers_vs_Range.png.
37
CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 3-18; A320 Family, AIRBUS,
http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/a320family/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2012).
38
The Timeline, AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/company/history/the-timeline/ (click
June 1987: A330-300 launch, A340-200 launch, A340-300 launch) (last visited Oct. 3,
2012).
39
Commonality,
AIRBUS,
http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/
commonality/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
40
One unique aspect of the LCA industry is that developing and producing aircraft
requires monumental up-front investments, with a long lead time before generating revenue.
CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 2-1; DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra
note 32, ¶ 27. For example, in 1966, Boeing spent an estimated $1.2 billion—more than
three times its total capitalization at that time—developing the 747. CHANGING STRUCTURE,
supra note 17, at 2-1 n.15. The size of these investments essentially make the development
of each new aircraft a bet-the-company investment. Id. at 2-1. This creates enormous
barriers to entry in the LCA industry, and makes financing without government intervention
exceedingly difficult except for established producers. Id. at 2-1 to 2-3; see DS316 EC First
Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶¶ 27–33.
41
Mathis, supra note 13, at 189–90; CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 2-3.
42
DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶ 289–90.
43
Id. ¶¶ 302–07, 319–23. The United States characterizes launch aid as ―long-term
unsecured loans at zero or below-market rates of interest, with back-loaded repayment
schedules that allow Airbus to repay the loans through a levy on each delivery of the
financed aircraft.‖ DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 4.
44
DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶¶ 328, 332, 338, 364–66.
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subject to dispute,45 and the subject of negotiated limitations.46
Airbus has continuously gained market share in the LCA industry,
going from fifteen percent in 1987,47 to twenty-nine percent in 1996,48 to
over fifty percent of the global market in 1998—finally overtaking its
American competitor.49 In 2003, Airbus delivered more new LCA than
Boeing for the first time, making it the largest producer of LCA in the
world,50 and it has maintained that title each year since. 51
In 1994, Airbus announced development of what would become its
A380, a super-jumbo jet projected to seat over 600 passengers, in an effort
to combat the monopoly Boeing enjoyed in jumbo jets with its 747.52
Boeing and Airbus had initially engaged in discussions for joint
development of the aircraft, but Boeing withdrew from the project when it
decided that the market would not bear such a large aircraft. 53 Airbus began
production on the A380 in 2000 when it secured commitments for 50
purchases of the new aircraft.54 On May 7, 2004, Airbus officially opened
the final assembly line of the A380 in Toulouse, France, 55 and the A380
took its first test flight on April 27, 2005.56 As the largest aircraft in history
and the first to have double decks along the entire length of the aircraft, the
A380 made its first commercial flight on October 25, 2007, and to date,
Airbus has recorded 243 orders for this aircraft. 57
45
The United States alleges that Airbus has received highly preferential financing for the
development of each of its families of aircraft. DS316 US First Written Submission, supra
note 34, ¶¶ 4, 49, 50, 52, 55, 70.
46
See LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4.
47
DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 54.
48
CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 3-19.
49
Lee, supra note 31, at 120.
50
DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 74.
51
Tim Hepher, Airbus in the Lead, but Boeing Looks Set to Have a Great 2012, AL
ARABIYA NEWS (Dec. 22, 2011), http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/12/22/184007.html;
David Pearson, Airbus Keeps Top Spot Over Boeing, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204468004577166423079873112.html?mo
d=rss_whats_news_us_business.
52
See David Bowen, Airbus Will Reveal Plan for Super-Jumbo: Aircraft Would Seat at
Least 600 People and Cost dollars 8bn to Develop, INDEPENDENT, June 4, 1994, available at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/airbus-will-reveal-plan-for-superjumboaircraft-would-seat-at-least-600-people-and-cost-dollars-8bn-to-develop-1420367.html.
53
Fischer, supra note 15, at 877–78; CHANGING STRUCTURE, supra note 17, at 6-10, 6-12
n.759.
54
Airbus Jumbo on Runway: Boeing Seen Building Rival to Airbus A380 as
Transatlanctic [sic] Scrap Intensifies, CNNMONEY (Dec. 19, 2000, 9:27 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2000/12/19/europe/airbus/.
55
The ―Wow‖ Factor . . . and a New Era Dawns (2004–2007), AIRBUS,
http://www.airbus.com/company/history/the-narrative/the-wow-factorand-a-new-era-dawns2004-2007/(last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
56
Id.
57
A380 Family, AIRBUS, http://www.airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/
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In addition, in 2004, Airbus announced development of the A350
XWB, a long-range, mid-size, wide-body aircraft intended to compete
directly against Boeing‘s 787 Dreamliner, also making use of lightweight
composite materials for the airframe.58 The aircraft has faced a stream of
delays, but is expected to begin final assembly in 2012 and enter service in
2014,59 and has generated 567 orders from 35 customers. 60
III. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
Over the course of the competition between Airbus and Boeing,
negotiations as to trade in the LCA industry and international trade in
general have been ongoing, and have produced three primary agreements
that affect the LCA industry and the Airbus–Boeing dispute. First, the
GATT Tokyo round in 1979 produced an agreement concerning trade in
civil aircraft and a subsidies code. Second, in 1992, the United States and
the EC entered a bilateral agreement on trade in Large Civil Aircraft to
supplement the GATT agreement. Last, in 1994, the Uruguay round of the
GATT created the WTO, which included the SCM Agreement and the
DSU.
A. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The 1979 GATT Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations
produced, among other agreements, a plurilateral Agreement on Trade in
Civil Aircraft (ATCA). 61 The preamble of the agreement noted that the
Tokyo round sought to ―achieve the expansion and ever-greater
liberalization of world trade through, inter alia, the progressive dismantling
of obstacles to trade and the improvement of the international framework
for the conduct of world trade.‖62 It also stated that the agreement was
meant ―to eliminate adverse effects on trade in civil aircraft resulting from
governmental support in civil aircraft development, production, and

a380family/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012); Michael Smith, Airbus A380 Lands in Sydney on
First Commercial Flight, REUTERS (Oct. 25, 2007, 4:59 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2007/10/25/us-singapore-airlines-a-idUSSP20547320071025.
58
Airbus to Launch Boeing 7E7 Rival, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/business/4085631.stm (last updated Dec. 10, 2004); A340 XWB, AIRBUS, http://www.
airbus.com/aircraftfamilies/passengeraircraft/a350xwbfamily/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
59
Airbus Owner EADS Reports Profits Fall and A350 Delays, BBC NEWS (Nov. 10,
2011, 7:32 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15670426.
60
Press Release, Airbus, Airbus in Illescas Delivers First A350 XWB Wing Lower Cover
to Airbus in Broughton (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.airbus.com/presscentre/pressreleases/
press-release-detail/detail/airbus-in-illescas-delivers-first-a350-xwb-wing-lower-cover-toairbus-in-broughton/.
61
Mathis, supra note 13, at 192; Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, Apr. 12, 1979,
GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) (1980) [hereinafter ATCA].
62
ATCA preamble.
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marketing.‖63 Specifically, the agreement called for the elimination of all
import duties on civil aircraft and components, and established a Committee
on Trade in Civil Aircraft to meet as necessary to consult on matters
relating to the agreement. 64
More importantly, concerning subsidies, the agreement also
incorporated the portion of the 1979 GATT relating to subsidies. 65 This
agreement sought to ―reduce or eliminate the trade restricting or distorting
effects‖66 of subsidies, yet also recognized that domestic ―subsidies are
widely used as important instruments for the promotion of social and
economic policy objectives.‖67 Therefore, the agreement prohibited export
subsidies but permitted domestic subsidies, subject to assessment of
countervailing duties.68 The agreement was also limited in its effectiveness
because it did not define the term ―subsidy,‖ making it more of ―a general
declaration of principles than a specific enforceable document.‖69
The GATT also included an elementary dispute settlement procedure,
in place since its inception in 1947.70 Under this procedure, a member
could request the formation of a panel to hear a dispute, but any member,
including the subject of the complaint, could delay or block the process by
preventing the establishment of a panel and hindering the selection of
panelists or the term of the panel. 71 In addition, panel reports needed a
consensus to be adopted, allowing even the losing party to prevent
enforcement of the report.72
B. Bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
Because of the obvious deficiencies of the GATT in dealing with
subsidies in the civil aircraft industry, and in light of Airbus‘ increasing
success against Boeing and American manufacturers, the United States
soon felt pressure to reach a new agreement limiting subsidies. 73 In 1984,
the United States began discussions to revise the GATT‘s ATCA, hoping to
eliminate subsidies to Airbus.74 The United States also began bilateral

63

Id.
Id. arts. 2, 8.
65
Id. art 6.
66
Subsidies Code preamble, art. 11(1).
67
Id.
68
Mathis, supra note 13, at 193.
69
Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 198.
70
Fischer, supra note 15, at 879–80.
71
Lee, supra note 31, at 135.
72
Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 204.
73
Fischer, supra note 15, at 874; Mathis, supra note 13, at 195; Meier-Kaienburg, supra
note 1, at 198.
74
Jennifer A. Manner, How to Avoid Airbus II: A Primer for Domestic Industry, 23 CAL.
W. INT‘L L.J. 139, 144 (1992); Lee, supra note 31, at 123–23.
64
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negotiations in 1987 with the EC regarding Airbus‘ funding.75 These
discussions stalemated over the percentage of development costs that could
be subsidized, until the United States learned of an explicit export subsidy
provided to Deutsche Airbus in the form of exchange rate guarantees worth
an estimated $2.5 million on each aircraft delivered in 1990.76 The United
States brought a GATT action against the EC. A GATT disputes panel
found in favor of the United States in January 1992, although the EC
blocked adoption of the ruling in the GATT council, precluding the
implementation of remedial measures by the United States. 77
While this first complaint addressed only the particular export subsidy
to Deutsche Airbus, the United States also filed a second complaint in May
1991 broadly covering subsidies given to each of the Airbus entities by the
member governments since its inception, totaling $13.5 billion.78 Having
already blocked one panel report and facing this much more far-reaching
complaint, the EC finally relented and agreed to certain limits on subsidies
to Airbus in a bilateral agreement with the United States. 79 Rather than
establishing a comprehensive scheme addressing subsidies in large civil
aircraft, though, this agreement was merely a concession by the EC to keep
the United States from pursuing its GATT case, and was thus limited in its
effectiveness.80
Still, the bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, signed
in July 1992, made some important strides to establishing limits on
subsidies.81 First, the agreement addressed direct subsidies by banning all
future production subsidies82 and limiting development subsidies at thirty-

75

Lee, supra note 31, at 124.
Manner, supra note 74, at 145; Shane Spradlin, Comment, The Aircraft Subsidies
Dispute in the GATT‘s Uruguay Round, 60 J. AIR L. & COM. 1191, 1207 (1995).
77
Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1208–09; Manner, supra note 74, at 148–49.
78
Manner, supra note 74, at 150.
79
Richard O. Cunningham, Subsidies to Large Civil Aircraft Production: New WTO
Subsidy Rules and Dispute Settlement Mechanism Alter Dynamics of U.S.-E.U. Dispute, AIR
& SPACE LAW, Fall 1999, at 4–5; Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1208.
80
Cunningham, supra note 79, at 5; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: LONG-TERM VIABILITY OF US—EUROPEAN UNION AIRCRAFT AGREEMENT
UNCERTAIN 3 (1994) [hereinafter LONG-TERM VIABILITY], available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1995/gg95045.pdf. U.S. representatives saw foregoing a GATT complaint on
subsidies to Airbus as the primary consideration they gave to the EU under the treaty, since
they did not believe that current or future levels of indirect aid would reach the limits set in
the agreement. Id. at 15–16, 23–24, 34. The EU placed more value on the limitation of
indirect aid, however, and viewed the treaty as a trade-off between their direct aid and the
United States‘ indirect aid. Id. at 15–16.
81
Michael J. Levick, Comment, The Production of Civil Aircraft: A Compromise of Two
World Giants, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 433, 452 (1993).
82
LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art. 3. Production includes ―all manufacturing,
marketing and sales activities‖ other than development costs. LCA Agreement Annex II, ¶
4. The Agreement did grandfather in existing production subsidies, however. Id. art. 3.
76
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three percent of a new plane‘s total development costs. 83
These
development subsidies were allowed only in the form of loans, where they
could be expected to be repaid within seventeen years.84 They were
additionally required to be repaid in that timeframe at an interest rate no
less than the cost of borrowing to the government. 85
In regard to indirect subsidies, the Agreement capped permissible
levels of benefit received indirectly through government contracts at three
percent of the industry-wide turnover and four percent of the turnover for
each individual manufacturer. 86 Indirect benefits were defined as any
―identifiable reduction in costs of large civil aircraft resulting from
government-funded research and development in the aeronautical area.‖87
The Agreement also sought transparency by requiring the regular
exchange of information relating to subsidies.88 Along those same lines, the
agreement called for the parties to meet at least twice a year ―to ensure the
correct functioning of the Agreement‖89 and allowed either party to request
consultations relating to the functioning of the agreement. 90 However, the
agreement provided no remedy for breach, so the only recourse for noncompliance was abrogation of the agreement. 91 In addition, while the

83
Id. art. 4; Levick, supra note 81, at 452. Development costs include design, testing,
equipment development, flight testing, and prototype manufacturing costs. LCA Agreement
Annex II, ¶ 3.
84
LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art. 4.
85
Id.
86
Levick, supra note 81, at 452.
87
LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art 5.3. The Agreement also expanded on this
definition in Annex II, which defines ―indirect government support‖ as ―[F]inancial support
provided by a government . . . for aeronautical applications, including research and
development, demonstration projects and development of military aircraft, which provide an
identifiable benefit to the development or production of one or more specific large civil
aircraft programmes.‖ Id. Annex II, ¶ 5.
88
Id. art. 8.
89
Id. art. 11.
90
Id. art. 11.
91
Id. art. 10. This immediately called into question the viability of the agreement,
though the parties saw the benefits of the agreement, namely, ―constraints on direct support
provided to Airbus, in the case of the United States, and a reduction in the threat of trade
action in the case of the EC,‖ as reasonable incentives for compliance. LONG-TERM
VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 3. Disagreements over interpretation of the agreement began
nearly immediately following the agreement, however, particularly as to the definitions of
production subsidies and indirect subsidies. Id. at 19–21, 23–28. As to indirect subsidies,
the EC calculated indirect benefits by totaling the total amount of government appropriations
for aeronautics research and development, without regard for what benefits, if any, flowed to
LCA, while the U.S. methodology was to ask LCA manufacturers to self-identify what
benefits they received for specific existing LCA through government-sponsored research and
development. Id. at 23–27. Using these methods, the EC calculated indirect subsidies by the
United States at between 4.4% and 5.8% in 1992, in excess of the agreed limits, id. at 25,
while the United States calculated that zero indirect benefits were realized during that time.
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parties agreed not to initiate trade actions with respect to subsidies in
conformity with the Agreement so long as it is in force,92 they retained their
rights and obligations under the GATT 1947 and any successor
agreements,93 so when the United States later abrogated the agreement, the
GATT agreements, and not the bilateral agreement, governed the dispute in
the WTO.94
C. Uruguay Round Agreements
Following the bilateral agreement, the parties continued discussions to
try to create a new agreement addressing large civil aircraft under the
GATT as part of the Uruguay Round. 95 However, disagreements began
immediately, as the United States wanted to set the 1992 agreement as a
baseline and build on its commitments, while the EC preferred to eliminate
the 1992 agreement, or alternatively, to exempt civil aircraft from the
Subsidies Code.96 The parties grew even further apart during 1993 as each
attempted to strengthen their respective subsidy programs. 97 As the
deadline approached without progress on the civil aircraft agreement,
neither party was willing to let this one industry derail the GATT
agreements that covered trillions of dollars in annual world trade. 98 A
compromise eventually won out under which the 1992 agreement would
remain in force and the civil aircraft industry would remain subject to the
GATT Subsidies Code.99 The parties also agreed to a one-year standstill
during which neither side would challenge subsidies to allow for further
negotiations.100
Consequently, when the GATT Uruguay round was signed on
Id. at 26.
92
LCA Agreement, supra note 8, art. 10.2.
93
Id. preamble.
94
DS316 Panel Report, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 7.89, 7.98, 7.100. This interpretation was not
without dispute, though. See id.
95
Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 201; LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 42.
96
Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1210.
97
Id. at 1210–11. The U.S. LCA industry sought additional indirect governmental aid,
such as increased funding for the U.S. Export–Import Bank, while France unveiled
additional funding for industrial production. Id.; Civil Aircraft Needs Continued Coverage
Under Subsidies Code, U.S. Industry Says, 9 INT‘L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 1386 (Aug.
12, 1992); French Trade Official Says Airbus‘ Fears in GATT Talks Are Unjustified, 10
INT‘L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 1687 (Oct. 6, 1993).
98
Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1212; Gow, supra note 3.
99
Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1213–14; LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 42.
Though LCA as a whole were included under the SCM Agreement, two footnotes were
added exempting LCA from certain avenues to establishing ―serious prejudice,‖ as a
concession to the EU, and research and development for LCA were also excepted from the
protected category of Non-Actionable Subsidies. SCM Agreement art. 6.1 n.15, n.16, art.
8.2 n.24; LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 45–47.
100
Spradlin, supra note 76, at 1213–1214.
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December 15, 1994, it did not include a new agreement on civil aircraft. 101
However, the Uruguay round produced the SCM Agreement and the DSU,
each of which affects the LCA industry.
1. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
The SCM Agreement made an important improvement on the GATT
by defining ―subsidies.‖102 Under the SCM Agreement, a subsidy exists
where ―there is a financial contribution by a government‖ and ―a benefit is
thereby conferred.‖103 Financial contribution is broadly construed as
meaning ―money or anything else of value provided to a manufacturer or
exporter at a cost less than would have been charged in a commercial
transaction.‖104 This includes measures such as exchange rate guarantees,
debt forgiveness, export credits, and equity infusions, and any capital or
development supports provided on terms more favorable than terms
available from commercial lenders.105 In addition, this can also include
indirect support such as benefits from government or defense contracts. 106
The SCM Agreement splits subsidies into three classifications, referred
to as the ―traffic light approach.‖107 Under this approach, one class of
subsidies is permissible (―green light‖), a second class is actionable only
upon showing of adverse effects on free trade (―yellow light‖), while the
third class is prohibited almost entirely (―red light‖).108
Export subsidies, defined as ―subsidies contingent, in law or in
fact, . . . upon export performance,‖109 or ―upon the use of domestic over
imported goods,‖110 fall under the class of Prohibited Subsidies (―red
light‖).111 The SCM Agreement provides an illustrative list of export
subsidies that includes the ―provision by governments of direct subsidies to
a firm or an industry contingent upon export performance‖ in addition to
other items such as exchange rate guarantees or other measures that give
preference to exports over domestic products. 112 These prohibited subsidies
are actionable without a showing of adverse effects, and the dispute
resolution process is accelerated when contesting these subsidies. 113
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 199; LONG-TERM VIABILITY, supra note 80, at 42.
Mathis, supra note 13, at 200.
SCM Agreement art. 1.1.
Cunningham, supra note 79, at 6.
Id.
Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 202–03.
Id. at 203.
Id.
SCM Agreement art. 3.1.
Id.
Id.
Id. Annex I.
Id. arts. 3, 4.
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To fall under the category of Actionable Subsidies (―yellow light‖), the
subsidy must be a specific subsidy114 and cause adverse effects to the
interests of another member, including ―(a) injury to the domestic industry
of another Member; (b) nullification or impairment of benefits accruing
directly or indirectly to other Members . . . ; [or] (c) serious prejudice to the
interests of another Member.‖115 A specific subsidy is any subsidy where
―the granting authority . . . explicitly limits access to a subsidy to certain
enterprises,‖ or where the subsidy has that effect in fact. 116 Serious
prejudice is found when the subsidy displaces or impedes imports into the
subsidizing country or a third country market, when the subsidy causes
significant price undercutting, suppression, depression, or lost sales, or
when the subsidy increases the world market share of the subsidizing
country.117
2. Dispute Settlement Understanding
The Uruguay round also produced the DSU, which was an important
improvement on the dispute resolution process under GATT. Unlike the
GATT process, under which a single party could block the adoption of a
panel report, the DSU requires a consensus to reject a panel report, making
the presumption in favor of adjudication.118 Like the GATT process,
though, the DSU is primarily aimed at conciliation and is targeted more
towards facilitating the process than creating a resolution.119
The dispute resolution process begins under the DSU when a Member
State files a Request for Consultations. 120 The request must identify the
measures at issue and the legal basis for the complaint. 121 During this
consultation stage, the parties are to meet and attempt to resolve the dispute
on their own.122 This stage is meant to take no more than sixty days.123
If the parties fail to reach an agreement, the complaining party can
then request that the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) establish a panel to
adjudicate the dispute. 124 The defendant party can block the formation of a
panel once, but the DSB will establish a panel upon request at its second
114

Id. art. 1.2.
Id. art. 5.
116
Id. art. 2.1.
117
Id. art. 6.3.
118
Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 204.
119
Mathis, supra note 13, at 199.
120
Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution, WORLD TRADE
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2012) [hereinafter Settling Disputes]; Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 211; see DSU art. 4.
121
DSU art. 4.4.
122
Id. art 4; Lee, supra note 31, at 136–37; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
123
DSU art. 4.7; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
124
DSU art. 4.7; Lee, supra note 31, at 136–37; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
115
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meeting barring a consensus against appointing the panel. 125 Because there
are no permanent panels, a new panel is created for each dispute. 126 The
parties to the dispute may decide on the members of the panel, but if they
cannot agree they can request that the Director-General choose the
panelists.127 A panel is supposed to be formed within forty-five days of the
request, and the panel is supposed to complete its work and issue its report
within six months.128 This means that the time from a request for
consultations to the issuance of a panel report is to be no more than one
year.129
A party may appeal a panel report to the Appellate Body (AB). 130 A
three-member panel chosen for each case from the seven-member AB, a
permanent body, hears the appeals. 131 However, factual determinations by
the original panel are not subject to appeal, as only issues of law and legal
interpretations may be raised on appeal.132 Within thirty days of a decision
by the appellate panel, or within sixty days of a panel decision if there is no
appeal, the DSB will adopt the report unless a consensus rejects it. 133
Upon a finding of a violation, the panel or the AB will recommend that
the infringing nation bring its measures into conformity with the applicable
obligations, and may, but is not required to, make suggestions as to how to
implement the recommendations. 134 Following the adoption of a panel or
AB report, the DSU expects ―prompt compliance‖ with the panel‘s
recommendations and rulings. 135 Absent a separately negotiated resolution,
―the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure
the withdrawal of the measures concerned.‖136 Within thirty days of the
adoption of a report, the offending party is to ―inform the DSB of its
intentions in respect of implementation of the recommendations and ruling
of the DSB.‖137 The party has ―a reasonable period of time‖ in which to
comply.138
In the absence of a negotiated agreement or full compliance, 139 the
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

DSU art. 6.1; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
Lee, supra note 31, at 137–38; see DSU art. 8.
DSU art. 8.7; Lee, supra note 31, at 136–37; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
DSU art. 12.8; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
DSU art. 20; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
DSU art. 17.4; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
DSU art. 17.1; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
DSU art. 17.6; Settling Disputes, supra note 120; Lee, supra note 31, at 139–40.
DSU arts. 16.4, 17.14; Settling Disputes, supra note 120.
DSU art. 19.1.
Id. art. 21.1; Meier-Kaienburg, supra note 1, at 225; Settling Disputes, supra note
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DSU allows for compensation and retaliation, 140 but these measures are
meant solely to bring the offending party into compliance with its
obligations and do not provide retrospective relief.141 If the party is not
compliant within a reasonable period of time, it can enter negotiations to
―develop[] mutually acceptable compensation.‖142 Compensation in this
context means a trade benefit granted by the losing party to the prevailing
party to prospectively counter the nullification or impairment caused by the
nonconforming measure. 143 However, because this only comes up in the
case of a noncompliant party yet requires the assent of that party, it is rare
in practice.144
If no agreement is reached, the prevailing party ―may request
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member
concerned of concessions or other obligations under the covered
agreements.‖145 The DSB will accept the request to suspend concessions
absent a consensus against it.146 The level of the suspension of concessions
is to be ―equivalent to the level of the nullification or impairment,‖ meaning
prospective rather than past nullification or impairment, and may only be
held in place until the offending party becomes compliant. 147 The
suspended concessions should be as closely linked to the sector subject to
the complaint as possible, but can apply to obligations in other sectors
under the same agreement, or under other agreements if necessary.148 Such
measures can be effective in exerting pressure on noncompliant parties, but
also adversely affect the retaliating party by making the imports subject to
retaliation more expensive to its own consumers. 149 These measures can
also burden industries that are not directly involved in the particular dispute
and that derived no benefit from the subsidies.150
D. Negotiations Following the Uruguay Round
Following the Uruguay Round, the United States felt increased

recommendations, the parties can refer the matter to the original panel for a determination.
DSU art. 21.5.
140
DSU arts. 3.7, 22; Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial
Compensation in the WTO, 8 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 101, 102 (2005).
141
Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 140, at 102–03; see DSU arts. 3.7, 22.
142
DSU 22.2.
143
Carlos M. Vazquez & John H. Jackson, Some Reflections on Compliance with WTO
Dispute Settlement Decisions, 33 LAW & POL‘Y INT‘L BUS. 555, 560 (2002).
144
Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 140, at 103.
145
DSU art. 22.2.
146
Id. art. 22.6.
147
Id. arts. 22.4, 22.8; Vazquez & Jackson, supra note 143, at 560.
148
DSU art. 22.3.
149
Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 140, at 102–04.
150
Id.
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pressure to limit LCA subsidies as Airbus continued to have success against
Boeing and steadily gained market share. 151 In 2003, Airbus delivered more
new aircraft than Boeing for the first time. 152 In addition, Airbus had two
aircraft in development: the A380, which would compete directly against
the 747, Boeing‘s flagship aircraft, and the A350 XWB, which would
compete directly against the 787, Boeing‘s revolutionary new midsize
aircraft.153 These threats to two of Boeing‘s most important assets, along
with Airbus‘ generally increasing market share, heightened concerns about
subsidies and set the stage for a confrontation.154 The parties engaged in
negotiations in the fall of 2004 in order to modify the 1992 Bilateral
Agreement, but were unable to make headway.155
IV. THE DISPUTE IN THE WTO
A. The Complaints
With these negotiations at a standstill, the United States chose to
abrogate the Bilateral Agreement on October 6, 2004, citing violations by
the EC.156 That same day, it initiated the WTO DSU process by requesting
consultations with the EC.157 The EC responded by filing its own request
for consultations, alleging that the United States violated the SCM
Agreement by granting subsidies to Boeing in the form of state tax breaks
and government contracts. 158
The Request for Consultations by the United States focused primarily
on launch aid, defined as the provision of financing for the design and

151
Robert J. Carbaugh & John Olienyk, Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: A Sequel, 4
GLOBAL ECON. J. Issue 2, Article 6, at 3 (2004), available at http://www.relooney.
info/0_New_10.pdf.
152
Id.
153
Fischer, supra note 15, at 878–79; Airbus to Launch Boeing 7E7 Rival, supra note 58;
see supra Part II.B.
154
Boeing v Airbus: See You In Court, ECONOMIST, (Mar. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Boeing
v. Airbus], http://www.economist.com/node/3793314; Nina Pavcnik, Trade Disputes in the
Commercial Aircraft Industry, 25 WORLD ECON. 733, 733 (2002); see Fischer, supra note 15,
at 878–79.
155
Carbaugh & Olienyk, supra note 151, at 3; Boeing v Airbus, supra note 154.
156
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Against
EU Over Unfair Airbus Subsidies (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://ustraderep.gov/
Document_Library/Press_Releases/2004/October/US_Files_WTO_Case_Against_EU_Over
_Unfair_Airbus_Subsidies.html. The EC does not recognize the validity of the United
States‘ withdrawal from the Bilateral LCA Agreement, maintaining that it did not violate the
agreement, so the United States had no right to renounce it. DS316 EC First Written
Submission, supra note 32, ¶¶ 124–30.
157
DS316 Request for Consultations, supra note 1, at 1.
158
DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 1.
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development of aircraft to the Airbus companies by the Member States. 159
The complaint alleged that these loans were provided at no-interest or
below-market interest rates, and with repayment contingent on the success
of the aircraft being funded, making projects possible that would not
otherwise be commercially feasible. 160 The United States alleged that this
financing accounted for one hundred percent of the development costs of
the A300 family, up to ninety percent for the A320, sixty to ninety percent
for the A330 and A340, and one third of the development costs for the
A380.161
In addition, the Request for Consultations alleged that Airbus received
government grants and government-provided goods and services to
develop, expand, and upgrade Airbus manufacturing sites for the
development and production of the A380.162 It also alleged Airbus received
grants and financing on preferential terms for research and development,
both directly and through the European Investment Bank (EIB). 163 Finally,
the complaint alleged that Airbus benefitted from the assumption and
forgiveness of debts, and infusions of equity and grants by the EC and
Member States.164
The alleged subsidies applied to the entire line of Airbus aircraft.165
The United States calculated the value of these subsidies for the A380 alone
at approximately $6.5 billion.166 These included approximately $4 billion
in launch aid, a €700 million ($900 million) subsidized loan from the EIB,
in addition to €751 million ($966 million) from Hamburg, €200 million
($257 million) from Toulouse, and ₤19.5 million ($31.2 million) from the
Welsh Assembly for various industrial facilities for the A380, plus
hundreds of millions of Euros in grants for research and development. 167
The Request for Consultations by the EC, meanwhile, focused on state
and local tax subsidies and indirect subsidies to Boeing through various
government contracts. 168 Specifically, the EC alleged that Boeing received
159

DS316 Request for Consultations, supra note 1, at 1. The EC refers to these types of
measures as Member State financing. See DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note
32, ¶ 290.
160
DS316 Request for Consultations, supra note 1, at 1–2.
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DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶¶ 49, 52, 55, 70.
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DS316 Request for Consultations, supra note 1, at 2.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 7; Press Release, Office of the
U. S. Trade Representative, U.S. Files WTO Case Against EU Over Unfair Airbus Subsidies
(Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://ustraderep.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/
2004/October/US_Files_WTO_Case_Against_EU_Over_Unfair_Airbus_Subsidies.html.
167
DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 7.
168
DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2; DS353 EC First Written Submission,
supra note 20, ¶ 23.
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just under $5 billion in benefits from the states of Washington and Kansas
relating to the 787 Dreamliner and $25 million from the State of Illinois and
City of Chicago for the relocation of its headquarters. 169 In addition, the
complaint alleged Boeing received over $16 billion in indirect subsidies in
the form of research and development and procurement contracts with the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of
Defense, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, an agency
of the U.S. Department of Commerce. 170 These contracts amounted to
subsidies to LCA, as alleged by the EC, by foregoing or waiving patent
rights and granting exclusive or early access to data, trade secrets, and other
knowledge resulting from the government-funded research. 171 Finally, the
complaint alleged that Boeing benefitted in the amount of over $2 billion
from special tax treatment for ―Foreign Sales Corporations‖ under the
Internal Revenue Code.172 These alleged subsidies totaled $23.7 billion.173
B. The Procedure
The parties held the consultations as to these complaints as required
under the DSU on November 4 and 5, 2004.174 These consultations did not
bring about a resolution, but just prior to moving forward with the DSU
process, on January 11, 2005, the parties were able to agree to a framework
for additional negotiations. 175 The agreement set as its objective ―to secure
a comprehensive agreement to end subsidies to large civil aircraft
producers.‖176 The parties agreed to both a subsidies standstill and a

169

DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 1; DS353 EC First Written
Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 23.
170
DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 1–2; DS353 EC First Written
Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 23.
171
DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 1–3. For example, the EC alleged
that Boeing‘s extensive use of composite materials in the 787 was made possible by decades
of research funded by the U.S. government for the express purpose of increasing the
competitiveness of the U.S. aeronautics industry. DS353 EC First Written Submission,
supra note 20, ¶ 13.
172
DS317 Request for Consultations, supra note 2, at 2–3; DS353 EC First Written
Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 23.
173
DS353 EC First Written Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 2.
174
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European Communities
and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1,
WT/DS316/2 (May 31, 2005); Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European
Communities, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1,
WT/DS317/2 (May 31, 2005).
175
Press Release, Office of the U. S. Trade Representative, United States Takes Next
Step
in
Airbus
WTO
Litigation
(May
30,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2005/May/United_States_T
akes_Next_Step_in_Airbus_WTO_Litigation.html [hereinafter United States Takes Next
Step].
176
EU/US Agreement on Terms for Negotiation to End Subsidies for Large Civil
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litigation standstill, and set three months for negotiations. 177 However, the
EC backed away from the goal of ending subsidies and instead considered
granting billions in new launch aid subsidies for the development of the
A350.178 Both parties therefore moved forward in the DSU process,
requesting the establishment of panels and the commencement of Annex V
procedures179 on May 31, 2005.180
Several procedural complications arose at this point, further
complicating the process and separating the timing of the two separate
proceedings.
The DSB considered each of the requests for the
establishment of a panel at its meeting on June 13, 2005, at which both the
United States and the EC objected to the establishment of the panels, as was
their right under the DSU.181 The United States further objected at that
meeting that the Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the EC
improperly exceeded the scope of its Request for Consultations and that the
additional alleged measures could therefore not be the subject of panel
proceedings.182
At its meeting on July 20, 2005, the DSB established separate panels
for the two proceedings, designated as DS316 for the complaint by the
United States and DS317 for the complaint by the EC. 183 The parties were
unable to agree on the members of the panels as to either dispute, so they

Aircraft, Jan. 11, 2005, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/january/
tradoc_120976.pdf.
177
Press Release, European Comm‘n, EU/US Agreement on Terms for Negotiation to
End Subsidies For Large Civil Aircraft (Jan. 11, 2005), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/january/tradoc_120978.pdf; Press Release, Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick
Regarding U.S.– EU Agreement on Terms for Negotiation to End Subsidies for Large Civil
Aircraft (Jan. 11, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/archive/Document_Library/Press_
Releases/2005/January/January_11,_2005_Statement_of_US_Trade_Representative_Robert
_B_Zoellick_Regarding_US-EU_Agreement_on_Terms_for_Negotiation.html.
178
United States Takes Next Step, supra note 175; Opening Statement of the United
States, First Meeting of the Panel, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 10, WT/DS316 (Mar. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/826.
179
Annex V of the SCM Agreement, titled Procedures for Developing Information
Concerning Serious Prejudice, is the equivalent of the discovery process for the WTO. See
SCM Agreement Annex V.
180
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, supra note 174;
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, supra note 174.
181
DS316 US First Written Submission, supra note 34, ¶ 11.
182
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Addendum, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1/Add.1 (June 27, 2005).
183
Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities,
Note by the Secretariat, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS317/4 (Oct. 25, 2005); Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the
United States, Note by the Secretariat, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/4 (Oct. 25, 2005).

590

Cleared for Landing
32:569 (2012)

each requested that the Director-General determine the composition of the
panels, which he did for both panels on October 17, 2005.184
The EC officially requested consultations on the additional issues that
the United States had objected to as outside the scope of the previous
consultations,185 and those consultations were held on August 3, 2005, but
again failed to resolve the matter. 186 The United States persisted in its
objection to the scope of the panel proceeding and refused to comply with
the Annex V procedures as to the items it considered outside the scope of
the Request for Consultations or improperly identified in the original panel
request.187 The EC requested that the DS317 Panel rule authoritatively on
the Panel‘s scope, but the Panel declined to do so.188 Because of this, the
EC subsequently requested that the DSB establish an additional panel as to
its new request for consultations. 189 On February 17, 2006, the DSB
established a panel regarding this new request, now designated as DS353,
and on November 22, 2006, the Deputy Director-General constituted the
panel at the request of the EC.190 With this new panel established, the EC
did not continue to pursue the DS317 complaint. 191
The DS353 Panel held its meetings in September 2007 and January
2008.192 The Panel notified the parties on four occasions that, ―in light of
the substantive and procedural complexities of this dispute,‖ it would not be
able to complete its work within the six month timeframe called for by the
DSU,193 before officially issuing its Final Report on March 31, 2011.194
184
Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities,
Note by the Secretariat, supra note 183; Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request
of the United States, Note by the Secretariat, supra note 183.
185
Request for Consultations by the European Communities, Addendum, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317/1/Add.1 (June 27, 2005).
186
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, United
States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, 1, WT/DS317/5 (Jan. 20, 2006).
187
DS353 EC First Written Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 52.
188
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, supra note
186.
189
Id. at 2.
190
Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities,
Note by the Secretariat, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS353/3 (Dec. 4, 2006).
191
DS353 EC First Written Submission, supra note 20, ¶ 53; Communication from the
Chairman of the Panel, United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS317/6 (Apr. 13, 2006).
192
WT/DS353—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint),
EUR. COMMISSION, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/wtodispute/show.cfm?id=354&code=1#_eusubmissions (last updated Oct. 19, 2011).
193
Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/4 (May 18, 2007);
Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting Trade
in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/5 (July 11, 2008); Communication
from the Chairman of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
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Both parties filed appeals, 195 and after holding hearings in August and
October 2011, the AB issued its report on March 12, 2012.196 The DSU
adopted the recommendations and rulings on March 26, 2012, bringing the
substantive portion of the DS353 dispute to a close.197
Meanwhile, the complaint by the United States against the EC and
Airbus has proceeded somewhat quicker, notwithstanding some procedural
complications of its own. Following the establishment of a panel in DS316,
the EC raised objections to the Annex V process based on the scope of the
panel request, similar to the United States‘ objections in DS317.198 In
response to the EC‘s request for a preliminary ruling on this objection, the
United States filed an additional request for consultations on January 31,
2006,199 and subsequently requested a panel for that request. 200 The United
States requested that the same panel address the matters raised in this
additional request,201 but the Deputy Director-General did not name the
existing DS316 panelists to the new Panel, designated as DS347.202
Because this separate panel proceeding would be duplicative, the United
Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/6 (Dec. 16, 2009); Communication from the
Chairman of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft
(Second Complaint), WT/DS353/7 (July 7, 2010).
194
DS353 Panel Report, supra note 4.
195
Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU)
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/8 (Apr. 1,
2011); Notification of an Other Appeal by the United States under Article 16.4 and Article
17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU) and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United
States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint),
WT/DS353/10 (Apr. 28, 2011).
196
Communication from the Appellate Body, United States—Measures Affecting Trade
in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS353/11 (July 6, 2011); DS353 AB
Report, supra note 5.
197
Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body,
United States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint),
WT/DS353/13 (Mar. 26, 2012).
198
DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶ 15.
199
Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities and Certain
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/1/Add.1 (Jan
31, 2006).
200
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European Communities
and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft,
WT/DS316/6 (Apr. 10, 2006).
201
Request by the United States for a Decision of the Dispute Settlement Body,
European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/5 (Apr. 10, 2006).
202
See Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States, Note by
the Secretariat, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS347/5 (July 24, 2006).
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States asked on October 6, 2006, that the panel suspend its work, 203 and
later allowed the DS347 panel to lapse 204 after the DS316 panel found in
favor of the United States in regard to the EC‘s objection to the temporal
scope of the proceeding. 205
With the proceedings set in motion, the Panel held its first meeting
with the parties in March 2007 and its second meeting in July 2007.206 Just
as in the parallel proceedings, the DS316 Panel notified the parties on four
occasions that, due to the ―substantive and procedural complexities‖
involved in the dispute, it would not be possible for the Panel to complete
its work within six months of its composition, 207 before publicly releasing
its final report on June 30, 2010.208 The EC and United States each filed
appeals,209 and after hearings in November and December 2010, the AB
circulated its report on May 18, 2011.210 The DSB adopted the AB report
and the panel report, as modified by the AB report, at its meeting on June 1,
2011.211
203
Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS347/6 (Oct. 10,
2006) The decision by the United States to pursue its original complaint, DS316, while the
EC ultimately pursued its refiled complaint, DS353, is what caused the two actions,
originally filed on the same day, to be separated by almost a year.
204
Lapse of Authority for the Establishment of the Panel, Note by the Secretariat,
European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS347/7 (Oct. 9, 2007).
205
DS316 EC First Written Submission, supra note 32, ¶ 22.
206
DS316 Panel Report, supra note 4, ¶ 1.13.
207
Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/7 (Apr. 13,
2006); Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/9 (Dec. 14,
2007); Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/10 (Oct. 20,
2008); Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, European Communities and Certain
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/11 (Dec. 7,
2009).
208
DS316 Panel Report, supra note 4.
209
Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, European
Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, WT/DS316/12 (July 23, 2010); Notification of an Other Appeal by the United
States under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under Rule 23(1) of the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/13 (Aug. 20, 2010).
210
DS316 AB Report, supra note 5.
211
Appellate Body Report and Panel Report, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body,
European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/16 (June 6, 2011).
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C. The Panel and AB Findings
1. The DS316 Panel and AB Findings
In the DS316 Panel Report, released on June 30, 2010, the panel found
a substantial amount of subsidies to Airbus.212 The panel held that each of
the challenged launch aid measures was a specific subsidy under the SCM
Agreement.213 The Panel further held that fourteen of the seventeen
challenged provisions of infrastructure and infrastructure-related grants
were specific subsidies, including the provision of manufacturing sites in
Hamburg and Toulouse, a runway extension at the Bremen Airport in
Germany, and grants from Germany and Spain for manufacturing and
assembly facilities. 214
In addition, the Panel held in favor of the United States in regard to
each of the French equity infusions, the majority of the challenged research
and technological development funding, and the German government‘s
transfer of its ownership in Deutsche Airbus to the Daimler Group. 215 It did
not find, however, that any of the challenged loans by the EIB, though
subsidies, were specific subsidies. 216
Of each of these measures that the Panel found to be specific subsidies,
the Panel found only the launch aid provisions by three of the four Airbus
nations to the A380 to be in the category of prohibited subsidies as export
subsidies.217 The remaining launch aid subsidies were not held to be
contingent on either law or fact upon anticipated export performance, so
they were not held to be prohibited subsidies.218 These remaining launch
aid subsidies and the rest of the specific subsidies therefore required a
showing of adverse effects to be actionable. In this regard, the Panel found
that the subsidies had caused adverse effects of serious prejudice to the
United States‘ interests under Article 6.3 of the SCM Agreement by
displacing imports and exports and causing significant lost sales. 219 The
Panel noted that ―Airbus‘ market share is directly attributable to its ability
to sell and deliver to the European Communities and relevant third country
markets, LCA which it would not have had available but for the subsidies
which supported the launch of every model of Airbus LCA.‖220 While these
adverse effects were sufficient to make the subsidies actionable, the Panel

212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
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did not find that the subsidies caused adverse effects of price undercutting,
suppression, or depression under Article 6.3(c) of the SCM Agreement, or
injury to the United States‘ domestic industry under Article 5(a) of the
SCM Agreement. 221
The Panel also rejected several of the United States‘ challenges of
launch aid subsidies for the development of the A350. The panel did not
find that any of the nations had committed to launch aid for the A350 as of
July 2005.222 In addition, the Panel rejected the claim that the history of
launch aid provisions to Airbus aircraft constituted an unwritten launch aid
program.223 These findings are important because they mean that if the
United States wishes to challenge launch aid for the A350, it will have to
initiate new proceedings, taking additional time and possibly giving Airbus
a competitive advantage in the meantime, instead of immediately applying
countervailing measures as it could have if the measures were determined to
be part of this proceeding.
The panel concluded by recommending that ―the subsidizing Member
granting each subsidy found to be prohibited withdraw it without delay,‖224
and that ―the Member granting each subsidy found to have resulted in such
adverse effects ‗take appropriate steps to remove the adverse effects or . . .
withdraw the subsidy.‘‖225 However, it declined to ―make any suggestions
concerning steps that might be taken to implement those
recommendations.‖226 Though the parties sharply disagreed in the press
over the extent to which the report favored each party‘s positions,227 the
total amount of illegitimate subsidies adds up to $18 billion by the United
States‘ calculations—more than any WTO panel has found in any previous
dispute.228
Both parties filed appeals.229
The EC230 objected to various
221

Id. ¶ 8.4.
Id. ¶ 8.3(a)(i).
223
Id. ¶ 8.3(a)(iv).
224
Id. ¶ 8.6.
225
Id. ¶¶ 8.7.
226
Id. ¶ 8.8.
227
Each party has asserted that the Panel favored them on approximately seventy percent
of their claims. Press Release, Airbus, Airbus Alerts on Counter Case on Boeing Subsidies
while WTO Panel Rejects US Claims, (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.airbus.com/
presscentre/pressreleases/press-release-detail/detail/airbus-alerts-on-counter-case-on-boeingsubsidies-while-wto-panel-rejects-us-claims/; DS 316 WTO Panel Subsidy Findings—
Win/Loss Analysis, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/aboutus/govt_ops/docs/wto/Win_and_
Loss_Analysis.pdf.
228
Oral Statement of the United States at the First Oral Hearing, European Communities
and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, ¶ 2, AB2010-1/DS316 (Nov. 11, 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2392.
229
Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, European
222
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conclusions of the Panel, primarily relating to whether the launch aid,
infrastructure measures, and equity infusions constituted specific subsidies,
and whether those measures were export subsidies or had caused serious
prejudice.231 The United States appealed the Panel‘s conclusions that no
launch aid program existed that would bring future launch aid to the A350
into the scope of the complaint, and that the launch aid did not constitute
prohibited export subsidies except for the A380.232
The AB panel upheld the Panel‘s conclusion that the launch aid
measures were specific subsidies, but reversed its conclusion that launch aid
for the A380 constituted an export subsidy, and limited the findings of
serious prejudice based on displacement. 233 The AB also reversed Panel
conclusions as to some of the infrastructure and research and development
measures,234 but upheld findings that certain capital investments and
research and development programs were specific subsidies.235 In addition,
the AB rejected the United States‘ arguments that certain launch aid
measures were prohibited export subsidies and held that allegations of a de
facto launch aid program were outside the terms of reference of the
Panel.236 The AB concluded by recommending that the EC bring its
measures, as found by the Panel and modified by the AB, into conformity
with its obligations under the SCM Agreement.237
On December 1, 2011, the EC notified the DSB that it had ―taken
appropriate steps to bring its measures fully into conformity with its WTO
obligations, and to comply with the DSB‘s recommendations and rulings,‖
and that it had removed all subsidies and adverse effects covered by the
DSB‘s rulings.238 Specifically, it stated that it had ―secured repayment of
[Member State Financing (MSF)] loans and terminated MSF agreements,
Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil
Aircraft, WT/DS316/12 (July 21, 2010); Notification of an Other Appeal by the United
States under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), and under Rule 23(1) of the Working
Procedures for Appellate Review, European Communities and Certain Member States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/13 (Aug. 19, 2010).
230
Upon the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, the European Union (EU)
replaced and succeeded the EC before the WTO. DS316 AB Report, supra note 5, at 1 n.1.
For continuity sake, though, I refer to the EC rather than the EU.
231
Id. ¶ 571.
232
Id. ¶ 572.
233
Id. ¶ 1414(e), (f), (j), (m), (n).
234
Id. ¶ 1414(g), (s).
235
Id. ¶ 1414(f), (h).
236
Id. ¶ 1415.
237
Id. ¶ 1418.
238
Communication from the European Union, European Communities and Certain
Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/17 (Dec. 1,
2011).
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increased fees and lease payments on infrastructure support to accord with
market principles, and ensured that capital contributions and regional aid
subsidies . . . are no longer capable of causing adverse effects.‖239 The
United States disputed, however, that these measures brought the EC into
compliance, and requested authorization from the DSB to take
countermeasures totaling between $7 and $10 billion per year in the form of
a suspension of concessions under GATT and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS). 240 The United States also accompanied this
request with a request for consultations to facilitate resolving the dispute,241
and the WTO later referred the matter back to the original panel, at the
United States‘ request, to determine compliance. 242
2. The DS353 Panel and AB Findings
The DS353 Panel circulated its final report on March 31, 2011. 243 As
to subsidies from state and local governments, the Panel found that some of
the measures from Washington, Kansas, and Illinois, and municipalities
therein constituted specific subsidies, including tax breaks from
Washington and Kansas, and a headquarters relocation incentive package
from Illinois and the City of Chicago.244 As to the indirect subsidies, the
Panel found that various NASA aeronautics research and development
programs constituted specific subsidies to Boeing in the amount of $2.6
billion.245 The Panel also determined that some of the U.S. Department of
Defense research and development programs constituted specific
subsidies.246 Of the $45 billion spent by the Department of Defense with
Boeing over the contested time period, the EC estimated that $2.4 billion
constituted specific subsidies to LCA, while the United States put that
number at less than $308 million.247 The Panel rejected both numbers, but
was unable to reach an estimate of its own as to the value of these
subsidies.248 The Panel also rejected allegations of various other subsidies,
239

Id ¶ 4.
Recourse to Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU by the
United States, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures Affecting
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/18 (Dec. 9, 2011).
241
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, European Communities and
Certain Member States—Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/19
(Dec. 9, 2011).
242
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, Constitution of the Panel,
Note by the Secretariat, European Communities and Certain Member States—Measures
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/24 (Apr. 25, 2012).
243
DS353 Panel Report, supra note 4.
244
Id. ¶¶ 7.302, 7.303, 7.819, 7.939.
245
Id. ¶ 7.1110.
246
Id. ¶ 7.1210.
247
Id. ¶¶ 7.1203, 7.1204.
248
Id. ¶¶ 7.1205–7.1207, 7.1210.
240
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including research and development contracts from the Department of
Commerce, allocation of intellectual property rights, and worker training
grants.249
The Panel also found that Boeing received prohibited export subsidies
under FSC tax benefits in the amount of $2.199 billion, but declined to
make a recommendation as to those because they were subject to a previous
WTO adjudication. 250 As to the remaining specific subsidies, the Panel
found that some, but not all, of the measures caused the adverse effects of
serious prejudice to the interests of another member by displacement,
significant price suppression, and significant lost sales. 251 The Panel
concluded by recommending that the United States ―take appropriate steps
to remove the adverse effects or . . . withdraw‖ these subsidies.252
U.S. representatives proclaimed victory, claiming that the Panel‘s
findings of $3 billion in new subsidies, 253 compared to the $24 billion in
alleged subsidies, ―amounts to a massive rejection‖ of the EC‘s case,254 one
that ―pales in comparison to the WTO‘s earlier findings that Airbus
benefited from illegal subsidies.‖255 Meanwhile, representatives on the
EC‘s side asserted that the cited subsidies resulted in at least $45 billion in
lost sales to Airbus, and have reiterated a desire to return to negotiations to
settle the dispute.256
The EC and the United States each appealed the report. 257 The United
249

Id. ¶¶ 7.1257, 7.1312, 7.1375.
Id. ¶¶ 7.1429, 8.6, 8.7.
251
Id. ¶ 7.1854, 7.1855.
252
Id. ¶ 8.9.
253
This number appears to exclude the benefits from FSC tax credits, which the United
States claims were separately resolved, and also appears to omit benefits from Department of
Defense contracts, which the Panel determined to be subsidies, but did not quantify. See
Press Release, Boeing, Boeing Response to Public Reports Regarding the WTO‘s Interim
Decision in DS 353 (Sept. 15, 2010), http://boeing.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43
&item=1423.
254
Id.
255
Dominic Gates, WTO‘s Boeing Ruling Could Fuel Subsidy Debate, Make Settlement
More Difficult, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/
businesstechnology/2012903753_boeingwto16.html.
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Aubrey Cohen, Exec: Illegal Boeing Subsidies Cost Airbus $45 Billion in Sales,
SEATTLEPI BLOGS (Sept. 21, 2010), http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/
222174.asp?from=blog_last3; Aubrey Cohen, Europen [sic] Source: Boeing Subsidies
Enough to Spur Negotiations, SEATTLE PI BLOGS (Sept. 15, 2010, 1:44 PM),
http://blog.seattlepi.com/aerospace/archives/221488.asp.
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Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States –
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States appealed the Panel‘s findings that certain state and local tax benefits
and aspects of Boeing‘s NASA and Department of Defense contracts
constituted subsidies.258 It also appealed the Panel‘s conclusions as to the
adverse effects of these measures. 259 The EC appeal, filed the day after the
public release of the Panel report, argued that the Panel erred in finding that
certain transfers of patent rights and purchases of services did not constitute
subsidies, and that the Panel should have considered the aggregate effect of
the subsidies in determining their adverse effects. 260 In its report, the AB
upheld most of the Panel‘s determinations as to the existence of subsidies,
though with minor modifications.261 It also upheld most of the Panel‘s
findings regarding adverse effects, also with modifications in each
direction.262 The AB report closed by recommending that the United States
remove the adverse effects or withdraw the subsidies. 263 Once again, both
parties claimed decisive victory. Airbus derided the 787 Dreamliner as the
―Subsidy-liner,‖ while the United States claimed that the decision
established ―that European subsidies to Airbus are far larger—by
multiples—and more distortive than anything that the United States does
for Boeing.‖264
Six months after the DSB‘s adoption of the panel and appellate reports
on March 23, 2012, the United States proclaimed that it had ―fully complied
with the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body in
this dispute.‖265 It stated that NASA and the Department of Defense had
revised each of the contracts found to be in violation of the SCM

States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint),
WT/DS353/10 (Apr. 28, 2011);.
258
Notification of an Other Appeal by the United States under Article 16.4 and Article 17
of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 23(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶¶ 1–9,
WT/DS353/10 (Apr. 28, 2011).
259
Id. ¶ 10.
260
Notification of an Appeal by the European Union under Article 16.4 and Article 17 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU),
and under Rule 20(1) of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review, United States—
Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), ¶¶ 2–3, WT/DS353/8
(Apr. 1, 2011).
261
DS353 AB Report, supra note 5.
262
Id. ¶ 1350(d).
263
Id. ¶ 1352.
264
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Agreement, had revised or terminated other policies and programs, and that
the state and local measures were no longer in effect.266 It additionally
stated that through these actions, ―any adverse effects of the subsidies in
question have ceased to exist.‖267 The EC thought otherwise. On
September 27, 2012, it requested authorization to impose countermeasures
against the United States in the amount of $12 billion annually to address
continuing subsidies and the continuing adverse effects of the covered
subsidies.268 It also requested consultations with the Unites States, the first
step in adjudicating compliance with the WTO‘s rulings.269
Thus, although the substantive portions of the dispute resolution
process have concluded for both the DS316 and DS353 disputes, the
enforcement stage of the proceedings is just getting underway, meaning the
ultimate conclusion, if any, could still be years away.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE DISPUTE
Having evaded a meaningful and comprehensive trade agreement in
the civil aircraft industry for over four decades now, a resolution will not be
achieved easily, and the resulting agreement is not likely to be painless for
any party. With both companies developing new aircraft meant for direct
competition, the incentives are extremely high to remove any competitive
advantage the opposing party‘s subsidies may afford it. The resolution of
the WTO processes may provide the parties with useful tools to resolve the
dispute, such as hard information as to each other‘s subsidies programs, and
possibly the threat of trade retaliation if the party does not comply with the
panel recommendations. Still, many factors will continue to work against a
comprehensive agreement to eliminate, or at least more stringently limit,
subsidies.
A. Challenges to Reaching a Resolution
First, there is a basic difference of ideas between Europe and the
United States on the role of government in the market that has manifested
itself throughout the history of the dispute.270 While Boeing began through
entrepreneurship and has grown largely absent direct government aid,
Airbus has been the product of government intervention from the very
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beginning.271 Resolving the dispute may require setting aside, or at least
putting on the table, each party‘s traditional understanding and philosophy
as to the role of government in industry. This difference is also reflected in
the types of subsidies the parties have provided, with Europe giving direct
subsidies to Airbus in the form of launch aid and the United States
subsidizing Boeing more indirectly through government contracts and tax
breaks.272 This difference in the two parties‘ approaches will create an
additional obstacle to an agreement because the different types of subsidies
and the different effects they have on the market prevent a direct
comparison between the two parties‘ subsidies. Instead, the differences will
allow additional room for argument as to the comparative effects and
permissibility of the respective programs and will require the parties to
haggle over the limitations to be set on each form of subsidy rather than
setting a single standard applicable to both parties. 273
In addition, the importance and prominence of the LCA industry to
both parties will cause them to jealously guard any advantage they can
secure. Civil aviation is the largest export industry in the United States, and
Boeing is the largest exporting manufacturer in the United States and the
world.274 Airbus also occupies a similar stature in Europe. 275 Even a slight
advantage, when multiplied by the massive size of the LCA industry, could
lead to significant economic benefits for the subsidizing party, so neither
the United Sates nor the EC will lightly give up any advantage it can gain.
Aside from competitive advantages, though, Airbus‘ success has obviated
the need for continued subsidies to overcome the barriers to entry in the
civil aircraft industry, 276 and has greatly diminished the difference between
the terms of the launch aid and the financing that it would be able to obtain
in an arms-length transaction on the open market,277 which may help
facilitate a resolution.
In addition to domestic economies, each party has defense issues to
consider in resolving the dispute. With many of the challenged subsidies to
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Boeing involving defense and government contracts, 278 the United States
may be hesitant to restructure its defense spending to comply with the WTO
rulings. Both companies also have substantial military components, and the
spillover effect of the subsidies on military contracts may also come into
play.279
One additional complication to resolving the dispute is that the LCA
industry may not be limited to the Airbus–Boeing duopoly for much longer.
As many as five other nations have ambitions in the LCA industry,
beginning at the small end with single-aisle aircraft, including China,
Russia, Japan, Canada, and Brazil. 280 Regional jet makers, primarily
Canada‘s Bombardier and Brazil‘s Embraer, are increasingly competing at
the small end of the LCA market. 281 Bombardier expects to introduce a
new series of aircraft in 2013 with a seating capacity somewhat below that
of the 737 and A320.282 Brazil is currently the world‘s third largest

278
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producer of commercial aircraft,283 and Embraer also competes at the small
end of the 737/A320 market and may be looking to expand. 284 More
importantly in the long term, Comac, the state-owned Commercial Aircraft
Corporation of China, has a new aircraft under development. 285 The C919,
seating 166 and set to enter service in 2016, will compete directly against
the 737 and A320.286 This is particularly significant because demand for
aircraft in China is projected to exceed 4,000 aircraft over the next twenty
years.287 These entrants to the narrow-body market, which currently
accounts for around sixty percent of the LCA market and is dominated by
the 737 and A320,288 pose serious threats to the continued dominance of
Airbus and Boeing over the LCA market.
With this competition looming, neither the United States nor the EC
will be eager to agree to limits on its own activities that will not apply to or
be enforced vis-à-vis its emerging competitors.289 While the long term will
likely require a pluri- or multilateral agreement among the LCA players,
adding additional parties to the already highly complex negotiations
between the United States and the EC could be counterproductive.290
Because of this, the parties may be content at this time to let the current
WTO rulings serve as a precedent on LCA subsidies. 291
B. Potential Resolutions
Despite these complications, the parties will likely need to return to the
negotiating table to reach an agreement limiting subsidies and resolving the
WTO dispute. Full and immediate compliance with the WTO rulings by
283
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either party is highly doubtful because, as in other high-profile WTO
disputes, the high stakes in the LCA industry give little incentive for prompt
compliance, and determining how to become compliant would be very
difficult even for a party inclined to do so, due to the complexity of the
case.292 Absent a negotiated agreement, then, each party would be left to
whatever remedies the DSU entitles it to coerce compliance from the
opposing party. This would likely take the form of a suspension of
concessions, since compensation—a trade concessions benefit to the
prevailing party by the party subject to the complaint—must be offered by
the noncompliant party, and is therefore quite unlikely. 293
The fact that the United States has been much less insistent on
returning to the bargaining table than the EC throughout the WTO
process294 may indicate that the United States is content with the SCM
Agreement as it stands, and with the remedies that the SCM Agreement and
DSU will entitle it. However, the large amount of subsidies found on both
sides means that absent full compliance or a negotiated solution, each party
would be able to impose massive trade sanctions against a wide range of
industries of the opposing party. 295 While this may resolve the instant
dispute in the WTO, it could also inflict significant harm on the imposing
party‘s domestic consumers, as well as industries of the opposing party
unrelated to the LCA industry.296 It would also be limited to the current
dispute, leaving the parties back at square one the next time subsidies come
up—for the A350, for example. Additionally, if such an arrangement is
unacceptable to the EC, the dispute would likely just spill over into the
already fragile and stalemated Doha Round of WTO negotiations.297
If a negotiated agreement is reached, one distinct possibility is that it
will be along the same lines as the 1992 Bilateral Agreement: rather than
establishing a comprehensive framework eliminating aircraft subsidies,
292
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each party may agree to just enough concessions to address its immediate
concerns and to keep the other from imposing any trade sanctions to which
the WTO decisions may entitle them. These concessions would likely take
the form of limiting or eliminating subsidies to the A350 and the 787,
which have been the most pressing concerns for the parties, and setting
slightly more restrictive limits on direct and indirect aid. Such a limited
agreement would be short-sighted and a missed opportunity, though. As the
1992 agreement demonstrated, such an agreement would be no more than a
stop-gap measure and would likely bring the parties back to the same
situation not too many years down the road.
Instead of settling for this option, the parties should return to the
negotiating table with the goal of ending all subsidies to the LCA
industry.298 The United States has insisted on the goal of eliminating
subsidies as to launch aid,299 but has yet to do the same with its own indirect
subsidies. The EC has preferred a more measured approach, but has
indicated that it is willing to remove its subsidies should the United States
do the same.300
The agreement should ban all production and development subsidies,
which would include any launch aid measures provided at terms that would
not be available on the market. The EC has decreasing incentive to
maintain such programs anyway, as their benefit to Airbus over private
alternatives has decreased with Airbus‘ success,301 and the rationales that
previously supported the EC‘s subsidies to Airbus to allow it to overcome
barriers to entry are no longer applicable. 302 The agreement should also ban
all indirect subsidies received through preferential contracts or access to
government facilities or intellectual property at no or reduced cost. In
doing so, it should also carefully define how such subsidies are determined
and calculated, so as to avoid the conflict over the definition of indirect
298
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subsidies that plagued the bilateral agreement. 303 Finally, as with the
bilateral agreement, the agreement should call for a regular exchange of
information in order to dispel suspicion and incentivize compliance.
Such an agreement would have much more staying power than an
agreement that stopped short of eliminating subsidies within the LCA
industry. An agreement that limited but did not eliminate subsidies would
create perpetual haggling over the comparative effects of the direct and
indirect subsidies, and cause a party to cry foul any time that party‘s
industry became disadvantaged relative to the other. In addition, this
agreement would give both parties additional credibility in potentially
seeking enforcement against any subsidies their emerging competitors may
utilize, or in future talks to multilateralize the treaty, which should be the
ultimate goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the creation of Airbus over four decades ago, the United States
and the EC have disputed over subsidies in the civil aircraft industry. This
dispute was the subject of negotiations between the parties over much of
that time without achieving any agreement that suitably addressed the
concerns of the parties before reaching a head and finally devolving to the
current all-out litigation in the WTO. After eight years, the WTO process is
finally nearing an end and the parties will be able to return to the
negotiating table to again attempt to produce an agreement. The history of
the dispute suggests that the current struggle will result in a patchwork
agreement to address the parties‘ more immediate interests in their new
aircraft. However, the parties should resist the temptation to reach such a
limited agreement and should instead take advantage of the information and
leverage that the exhausting WTO process has provided them to make an
agreement addressing the civil aircraft industry as a whole and eliminating
subsidies to the maximum extent possible.
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